Tax spillovers under separate accounting and formula apportionment by Nielsen, Søren Bo et al.
Tax Spillovers under Separate Accounting and
Formula Apportionment∗
Søren Bo Nielsen, Pascalis Raimondos-Møller
Copenhagen Business School, EPRU, CEPR and CESifö
Guttorm Schjelderup
Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration and CESifö
May 8, 2001
Abstract
It is observed in the real world that taxes matter for location decisions
and that multinationals shift profits by transfer pricing. The US and Canada
use Formula Apportionment (FA) to tax corporate income, and the EU is
debating a switch from Separate Accounting (SA) to FA. This paper develops
a theoretical model that compares basic properties of FA to SA. The focal
point of the analysis is on how changes in tax rates aﬀect capital formation,
input choice, and transfer pricing as well as spillovers on tax revenue in other
countries. The analysis shows that a move from SA to FA will not eliminate
such spillovers and will, in cases identified in the paper, actually aggravate
them.
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1 Introduction
Perhaps the most stunning feature of the world economy in the last decade is the
rapid growth in foreign direct investments (FDI). During the period 1990-1997 FDI
grew by approximately 20 per cent per year, and in 1997 foreign aﬃliate exports
was one-third of world exports. Furthermore, GDP attributed to foreign aﬃliates
accounted in 1997 for 7 per cent of global GDP, and sales of foreign aﬃliates have
during the nineties grown faster than world exports of goods and services.1
A second trend in the globalization process pertains to the new evidence of tax
competition and problems related to tax exportation.2 Devereux and Griﬃth (1998)
find that eﬀective marginal tax rates play an important role in the choice of location.
In a study that encompasses 10 of the major OECD countries Chennels and Griﬃth
(1997) find that statutory corporate tax rates have fallen in seven countries and
risen in three the last decade.3 On average, excluding Ireland, the rate has fallen
from 48 per cent to just over 40 percent. At the same time withholding taxes on
repatriated dividend income have fallen from 10 to 6.6 per cent on average, while on
interest income they have fallen from 10 to 8 percent. By tax exportation is meant
the possible negative eﬀects on economic activity and, therefore, the tax base in
other countries resulting from a given country raising its corporate income tax. Like
the issues more intimately related to MNEs, concerns about tax exportation also
center on tax spillovers of national corporate income taxation in the international
economy.
The increased importance of FDI and the fear of tax competition and tax ex-
portation has made tax practitioners, politicians, and economists to worry about
the eﬀectiveness of national corporate income taxation in a situation where MNEs
can move activities as well as their earnings between countries. At the heart of the
matter is the fear that low-tax countries may attract more than the lion’s share of
mobile tax bases.
1World Investment Report 1998.
2For a survey of the empirical literature on tax exportation see e.g. Mintz (1999).
3The countries are Australia, Canada, France, Germany, UK, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Spain, and
the US.
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The concerns voiced are not unfounded. Substantial evidence is now emerging
that documents profit shifting by transfer pricing.4 Grubert and Mutti (1991) and
Hines and Rice (1994) find strong indirect evidence for transfer pricing in that high
taxes reduce the reported profitability of U.S. aﬃliates in foreign locations. Harris
et.al. (1993) report that U.S. tax liabilities of American firms with aﬃliates in tax
havens are significantly lower than those of comparable American firms over the
1984-1988 period. Recently, Collins, Kemsley and Lang (1998) study a pooled sam-
ple of U.S. multinationals and find that ‘normalized’ reported foreign profitability
exceeds U.S. profitability among firms facing foreign tax rates below the U.S. rates.
The evidence of transfer pricing is also present in Europe. Weichenrieder (1996),
for example, finds that German firms have shifted profits to the low tax ”zone” in
Ireland.
Today’s system of corporate income taxation in the world is best characterized
by the principle of Separate Accounting (SA). Each individual country computes
the income generated by firms located within its jurisdiction (which can be entities
of MNEs) and subsequently applies the national tax rate to it. Besides the inher-
ent problems of some countries attempting to attract MNE activity and profits by
oﬀering lenient tax treatment, a further problem is that national definitions of tax
bases are not compatible, with the consequence that certain income items may un-
dergo taxation in more than one country. This is the international double taxation
problem.
A number of analysts have suggested that one way to avoid these problems may
be to switch from the system of Separate Accounting to one of Formula Apportion-
ment (FA).5 Under FA, each country aims at delimiting that part of a MNE’s global
income which is taxable in its jurisdiction. The instrument for accomplishing this
is a formula, containing relative activity measures weighted together. The relative
activity measures may include the MNE’s relative capital stock, relative sales, and
relative payroll in the country.6
4For a survey of the empirical literature see Hines (1999).
5Advocates for such a transition are among others Musgrave (1973), Bird and Brean (1986),
McLure (1989), Bucks and Mazerov (1993) and more recently Shackelford and Slemrod (1998).
6Both the US and Canada apply Formula Apportionment to the taxation of national firms. For
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With this FA system, it is evident that if a MNE moves profits from one country
to another by means of manipulation of transfer prices, this will not in itself lead
to a change in the tax base of any single country, whence FA seems to be immune
to MNE income shifting activity. Furthermore, if all countries agree on a common
definition of MNE taxable income and subsequently apply identical formulas to
determine their share of this income, double taxation of MNE income should be
obviated.
While the international tax literature contains numerous studies of the impli-
cations of the existing system of corporate income taxation (SA), the alternative
Formula Apportionment system has not been analyzed in much detail. Only a
few studies exist which examine the mechanics and economic consequences of taxa-
tion according to FA. McLure (1980) first demonstated that formula apportionment
transforms the state corporate income tax into three separate taxes on the factors
in the apportionment formula. This clearly induces state authorities to modify the
weights used in the formula in order to stimulate employment and investment in
their own state.7 Gordon and Wilson (1986) show that FA may seriously distort
producer prices if national tax bases are not harmonized internationally. They find,
for example, that if allocation is mainly tied to capital formation (or property), price
distortions will diﬀer among firms, creating incentives for mergers. When allocation
is based on payroll taxes they find opposite incentives in that mergers among firms
producing diﬀerent goods are discouraged. The tax system in this case creates in-
centives for production to locate in low tax countries with sales in high tax countries,
and conversely. Finally, it is shown that in equilibrium nations will choose ineﬃ-
ciently low tax rates. This latter result is analysed in detail in a recent paper by
Anand and Sansing (2000). They show that while the harmonised apportionment
rule will prevail as the cooperative solution of a game between two states, a state
can increase its welfare by deviating from this cooperative solution, i.e. a typical
an extensive outline of the FA system and its workings in the US see Weiner (1998).
7Goolsbee and Maydew (2000) have empirically documented the negative externalities on other
states associated with changes in the weights of the apportionment formula. Their results provide
evidence for the superiority of a harmonised formula apportionment rule.
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Prisoner’s Dilemma situation.
This paper diﬀers from those above in that it studies some other properties of
SA and FA as well as carrying out a comparison of the two systems. Specifically,
we examine how MNE activity is aﬀected under taxation according to SA and FA,
and what kind of spillovers between countries are present under the two systems.
Our analysis is carried out using a model of two countries embedded in a larger
world economy. The model portrays MNEs with a parent firm in one country and
a subsidiary in the other. These MNEs produce an output using a public input and
(plant-specific) capital. The public input is acquired by the parent company and
made available also to the subsidiary at a (transfer) price.
Under simplifying assumptions concerning symmetry we derive the eﬀects of
corporate income tax increases on the choice of capital and public inputs, as well
as on transfer pricing. Of special interest is how an increase in the corporate tax
in one country aﬀects capital stocks on the part of firms in the other country. This
information is then used to derive how the tax increase aﬀects tax revenue in the
other country and hence the character of the spillovers of tax policy. A main issue
is whether spillovers are more pronounced under SA than under FA, and whether
choosing one system or the other is likely to lead to too high or too low rates of
corporate income taxation in the world economy. We investigate these issues in a
situation in which the two countries can agree on the international tax principle, i.e.
SA or FA, but set their tax rates noncooperatively.
Our main results are the following: While under SA an increase in the rate
of tax in one country triggers a reduction in the capital stocks of MNEs in both
countries, under FA the cross-eﬀect on capital in other countries may be positive.
Furthermore, under both international tax schemes, the cross-eﬀect on tax revenue
of a tax increase in one country is of ambiguous sign. Closer investigation reveals
that the relative strength of tax spillovers under the two regimes depends on (a) how
costly it is for MNEs to undertake transfer pricing, and (b) how much pure profit
the MNEs generate. The same considerations determine whether SA or FA implies
the higher level of tax in a non-cooperative equilibrium, and in the end which of the
two schemes is preferable from an international perspective.
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We first prove these results for the case where tax authorities in the two coun-
tries simply maximize tax revenue. Subsequently we show that, provided there is a
balanced ownership of MNEs in the two countries, exactly the same results obtain
if the authorities instead maximize welfare.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 sets up a simple model of a MNE
operating in two countries. In section 3 the properties of SA as applied in the
taxation of the MNE are derived, and in section 4 a similar analysis is carried out
for FA. Section 5 then provides a thorough comparison of SA and FA. Section 6
demonstrates that similar results are obtained under tax revenue maximization and
welfare maximization. Finally, we conclude in section 7.
2 The model
Consider two countries, A and B, that together form only a small part of the world.
Each country is the host of a multinational firm which owns a subsidiary in the other
country. The two multinationals are assumed to be symmetric in their structure.
For convenience, we will use capital (small) letters to denote the activities of the firm
which has its headquarters in countryA(B) (to be called firmA andB, respectively).
Both MNEs produce a single good in each location using capital (K, k) and a public
input (S, s). The price of the final good as well as the public input is normalized
to unity.8 The input is public in the sense that the parent firm’s use of it does not
diminish its use by the aﬃliate, and vice versa.9 The parent firm charges its aﬃliate
a fee of (G, g) per unit of the public input. Since the production structure of each
aﬃliate of a MNE is assumed to be the same, and since the public input is equally
’shared’ between the parent firm and the subsidiary (or equally useful in the two
entities), the true price of the public input for each firm can be thought of as being
1/2. The price charged by the parent, however, may for profit shifting purposes be
above or below the true price of the input.
8In other words, these input and output markets are for simplicity taken to be perfectly com-
petitive.
9Examples of public inputs could be headquarter services or management expertise.
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Transfer pricing by the parent firm involves a resource cost H (G) which is as-
sumed to be a convex function where
H
µ
1
2
¶
= H 0
µ
1
2
¶
= 0,
H 0 > 0 (for G 6= 1/2) and H 00 > 0.10 Thus, if the price deviates from the true price
of 1/2, firm A incurs costs which are an increasing function of the deviation from the
true price. These costs may be interpreted as eﬀorts to conceal the transfer pricing
activity from national tax authorities.11 They represent pure waste of resources in
the model, but we emphasize that allowing tax authorities to collect fines instead
would not alter our results in a qualitative way.
Let R be the world rental rate of capital. Since prices are normalized to unity,
we have that pre-tax profits of the firm with headquarters in A and subsidiary in B
are, respectively
ΠA = F (KA, S) + (G− 1)S −RKA −H (G) .
ΠB = F (KB, S)−GS −RKB.
Note that F represents the common production structure of the two entities, and
that it is the headquarters which incur costs associated with distorting the transfer
price (as long as these costs are not deductible from taxation, this is immaterial,
though). If the governments in countries A and B tax this MNE, they can either
do so by using separate accounting or formula apportionment. We start by looking
at the implications of the former principle.12
3 Separate Accounting (SA)
Most countries use SA to determine profits of a MNE. An aﬃliate of a MNE is
subject to taxation in the jurisdiction of location, if the aﬃliate is a separate and
10Similarly for the parent firm in country B, that is h
¡
1
2
¢
= h0
¡
1
2
¢
= 0, h0 > 0 and h00 > 0.
11This assumption is standard in the literature on both tax evasion and transfer pricing (see e.g.
Kant 1988, or Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000).
12Given the symmetric production structure of the two entities of the MNE headquartered in
country A, it is suﬃcient in the analysis to consider this MNE only. There is no need to bring in
the B-MNE, except in the latter part of section 6.
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independent entity. In that case, taxable profits are derived from the firm’s books,
with the exception of the possible use of an arm’s length standard to correct for
the value attached to intra-firm trade. This means that if the price used by the
MNE on its intra-firm transactions does not correspond to the price that would
have occurred, had the parties been truly independent entities, then the transaction
may be revalued by the taxing authority. In what follows we assume that the taxing
authority cannot asses its true value.13 ,14
We define ti to be the tax rate in country i (i = A,B), and assume that the
rental price of capital and costs associated with transfer pricing are not deductible
from tax.15 Then global after-tax profits of the MNE are under SA
ΠSA = (1− tA) [F (KA, S) + (G− 1)S]
+ (1− tB) [F (KB, S)−GS]−RK −H (G) (1)
The assumption of lack of deductibility of transfer pricing costs can readily be altered
without aﬀecting the qualitative results to follow.
Given the intangible nature of the public good, the MNE can use its transfer
price to shift profits between the two countries. This does not mean that it shifts all
profits to the low-tax country. The reason is the resource costs that accrue under
transfer pricing. Thus, in the optimum the headquarters of the MNE balance the
13In practice it is very diﬃcult to find the correct transfer price, either because there may be no
comparable ’market’ price or because the cost structure of the exporting firm is private information
(thus making it diﬃcult to derive a ’synthetic’ price). If goods take on the character of intangibles,
problems become aggravated by the uniqueness of the good. In such cases authorities find it very
diﬃcult to argue that the item has been either overinvoiced or underinvoiced, whence the MNE
may get away with a distorted transfer price when incurring some extra costs.
14The two governments and the MNE are enganged in a two-stage game. At stage one the
governments choose taxes non-cooperatively and at stage two the MNE chooses its use of capital,
public input, and the extent of transfer pricing. This section analyses the second-stage decisions
while the first-stage decisions are analysed in subsection 3.1.
15A number of capital exporting countries give a tax credit upon repatriation for foreign taxes
paid. However, given the possibilities of deferral and the use of limited credits, it is generally agreed
that the source principle of taxation is eﬀectively in operation (see e.g. Tanzi and Bovenberg 1990,
and Keen 1993).
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marginal gains from profit shifting against the costs, yielding a first order condition
for G as follows,
∂ΠSA
∂G
= (tB − tA)S −H 0 (G) = 0, ⇒ (tB − tA)S = H 0 (G) . (2)
The first order condition in (2) is easily interpreted; it equates the tax savings of
transfer pricing to the marginal transactions costs of transfer pricing. The public
good will be underinvoiced, if tA > tB, and overinvoiced, if tA < tB; in either case
the transfer price increases the costs in the high tax country and income in the low
tax country. It is now straightforward to show from (2) that
∂G
∂tA
= − 1
H 00
< 0,
∂G
∂tB
=
1
H 00
> 0. (3)
An increase in tB raises the cost of accumulating profits in country B and induces
the MNE to increase the costs of the importing aﬃliate in B by increasing the price
of the input. If tA goes up, it becomes more costly to overinvoice and the MNE now
wants to accumulate profits in B by reducing the transfer price.
The first order conditions for the use of inputs are:
∂ΠSA
∂Ki
= (1− ti)F i1 −R = 0, i = A,B, (4)
∂ΠSA
∂S
=
£
(1− tA)FA2 + (1− tB)FB2
¤− [1− tA −G (tB − tA)] = 0, (5)
where ∂F/∂KA = FA1 (and similarly for KB and S).
The two first order conditions given by (4) have the usual interpretation of equat-
ing the after-tax marginal product of capital to the user cost of capital. Equation
(5) equates the after-tax contribution of the public input to production (the first
squared bracket) to the net of tax cost of using this input (the second squared
bracket). The latter includes the costs and benefits of using the input for profit
shifting purposes.16
Throughout the paper we will concentrate on the special case in which taxes ini-
tially are equal (tA = tB = t). The assumption of identical taxes simplifies formulas
16Note that on account of the convexity of the H function, the net cost of the public input lies
above 1−max(tA, tB) and below 1− (tA + tB)/2.
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considerably, while allowing us to derive some general characteristics of corporate
income taxation according to SA. With identical tax rates at the outset, the incen-
tive to shift profits by transfer pricing vaporizes (see (2)), the marginal productivity
of capital will be equalized across countries, i.e. FA1 = F
B
1 (see (4)), and the pub-
lic input is used only to maximize global production, i.e. FA2 + F
B
2 = 1 (see (5)).
Equal taxes (and a common production structure with a public input) also mean
that the level of the capital stock will be the same in each country. Under these
circumstances, all first and second derivatives of the production functions for the
parent and the subsidiary will be equal, whence we may dispense with superscripts
for the remainder of this section.
Total diﬀerentiation of first order conditions (4) and (5) implies, together with
symmetry, the following responses in capital stocks and inputs to changes in tax
rates:
∂Ki
∂ti
=
F1(2F22F11 − F 212)
2(1− t)F11(F22F11 − F 212)
∂Ki
∂tj
=
F1F
2
12
2(1− t)F11(F22F11 − F 212)
(6)
∂S
∂ti
=
F1F12
2(1− t)(F22F11 − F 212)
where i, j = A,B, i 6= j, and where the production structure is assumed to imply
(F22F11 − F 212) > 0. As to the signs and relative sizes of these derivatives, we note
from (6) that
∂KA
∂tA
=
∂KB
∂tB
<
∂KA
∂tB
=
∂KB
∂tA
< 0,
∂S
∂ti
< 0, i = A,B. (7)
The inequalities in (7) show that an increase in the tax rate of country i has a
stronger negative eﬀect on the capital stock of the firm in country i, but the cross-
eﬀect on capital in country j is also negative. Furthermore, a rise in the rate of
tax in either country leads to a fall in the use of the public input. To understand
these eﬀects note that an increase in country i’s tax directly raises the required
before tax marginal productivity of the capital stock in country i, and that lowers
the stock of capital in that country. A reduced capital stock in country i decreases
the marginal productivity of the public input S, the use of which therefore likewise
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is reduced. Less use of the public input in production in country j reduces the
marginal productivity of capital there, lowering the stock of capital employed.
Given the outline of the basic model and the comparative statics results, we are
now in a position to examine how taxes aﬀect national tax revenue. That is the
topic of the next subsection.
3.1 Tax spillovers under SA
Much of the discussion on taxation of multinationals has evolved around how na-
tional tax policy in one single country may impose externalities on other countries.
Here we investigate this question in further detail. The objective on the part of tax
authorities behind levying corporate income taxes may be to maximize some notion
of national welfare, or it may simply be to maximize revenue from the tax. As a
first shot we assume that revenue maximization is the objective of the government.
In section 6, however, the objective is alternatively taken to be maximization of wel-
fare. We are able to demonstrate there that under conditions of balanced ownership
of MNEs, equivalent results can be obtained.
Under revenue maximization, a marginal change in the tax rate of country B,
say, changes tax revenue in country A as follows (starting from the initial equilibrium
with equal tax rates),
∂VA
∂tB
= tA
·
F1
∂KA
∂tB
+ S
∂G
∂tB
¸
, (8)
where VA = tA [FA + (G− 1)S] is the tax revenue for country A. Having shown that
∂KA/∂tB < 0 and ∂G/∂tB > 0, we may state:
Proposition 1 Starting from the symmetric tax equilibrium, an increase in the tax
rate of country B has an ambiguous eﬀect on tax revenue in country A.
An increase in tB leads the MNE to raise its transfer price (∂G/∂tB > 0, see
(3)). This has the eﬀect of moving some profits from the subsidiary to the parent
company, thus raising the tax base in country A (i.e. a positive externality). At the
same time, however, the term ∂KA/∂tB is negative, see (7). It represents the eﬀect
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on production capacity in country A of a change in tB. This spillover is obviously
negative, and it is numerically greater, the greater is F12, and the smaller is F11, i.e.
the more cooperative the two production factors (capital and the public input) are,
and the less concave the production structure is. In fact, the size of this negative
spillover is completely governed by properties of the production structure.
Note that the fiscal externality that pertains to the widening of the tax base
will, other things being equal, lead to too low tax rates in the tax equilibrium since
neither country takes this eﬀect into account. In contrast, overlooking the negative
spillover eﬀect makes authorities impose a too high tax, ceteris paribus. Whether
tax rates will be set too low or too high in equilibrium then will depend on the
relative magnitudes of these eﬀects.
3.1.1 A Cobb-Douglas example
In order to gain more intuition for formulas here and in subsequent sections we shall
repeatedly consider a Cobb-Douglas example.
Specifically, assume that the production function F (.) is Cobb-Douglas and given
by F (K,S) = KαSβDγ, with γ = 1−α−β. The term Dγ can be interpreted as just
a constant, in which case we deal with a production structure featuring decreasing
returns to scale, or alternatively as the contribution from a suppressed third factor
of production D (which could be land, location-specific management, etc.). In what
follows we shall allude to the latter interpretation of the term.
With the Cobb-Douglas production structure, the expression in (8) becomes
∂VA
∂tB
= βFt
·
2
H 00
− α
2
2(1− t)γ(1− α)
¸
(9)
>From (9) it is seen that the cross-eﬀect on revenue in country A from a tax increase
in B becomes positive for a very low value of H 00. If transfer pricing is virtually cost-
less, the tax increase under consideration will induce a large shift of taxable income
from country B to country A and hence make for a positive revenue externality. At
the other extreme, if H 00 is very high, transfer pricing will not be used. But the
tax increase will lower the use of the public input and of capital in both entities of
the MNE; this will lower taxable income in country A and thus render the revenue
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externality negative. Further, a low value of γ, indicating that the hidden factor
of production (or rents) is unimportant, will make capital employment extremely
sensitive; in this situation, the tax increase in B sharply reduces capital use in A
and hence tax revenue there.
Finally, we note that the cross-eﬀect on revenue is proportional to the factor
share of the public input β (ignoring the sum constraint on α, β and γ). Hence, the
less important is the public input, the smaller is the net revenue externality under
SA.
Summing up, the net tax spillover under SA depends on the relative magnitudes
of a positive and a negative externality that arises if one country increases its tax
rate. In the Nash-equilibrium, tax rates may therefore be either too low or too high
depending on the relative strengths of these two eﬀects. This result is interesting
since it diﬀers from the main finding in the tax competition literature. In the stan-
dard tax competition model (see e.g. Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), or Wildasin
(1988)), taxes are set too low in the tax equilibrium due to the positive externality
that arises if one country increases its tax rate.
4 Formula Apportionment (FA)
In this section we consider the implications of corporate income taxation following
Formula Apportionment (FA) as an alternative to Separate Accounting.
In allocating a share of a multinational enterprise’s global income to any specific
jurisdiction, FA may utilize information on the relative capital stock employed in
that jurisdiction, the relative sales there, and the relative payroll there. For simplic-
ity we here consider only a simple variant of FA, in which the capital stock is the
sole factor entering the sharing formula in the FA.17 We likewise assume that the
17Note, that after a suitable redefinition of taxable income, the stock of capital can be interpreted
as the stock of labor, in which case the FA formula eﬀectively employs payroll in the sharing
formula. Moreover, observe that our simple formulation implies that the countries use the same
formula apportionment rule, and thus there already exists rule harmonization. Thus, our setup
abstracts from the issues examined in, e.g., Gordon and Wilson (1986) and Goolsbee and Maydew
(2000).
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FA arrangement makes use of the same definition in both countries for the multina-
tional’s global taxable income; the rates chosen in the two countries may in principle
diﬀer, though.
Under FA the before-tax profits on the part of the two entities of the MNE are
ΠA + ΠB, and taxable income in each country is divided according to the capital
stock in that country as a share of the MNE’s world-wide capital. Tax liability, Vi,
in either country is thus
Vi = ti
Ki
K
[F (KA, S) + F (KB, S)− S]. (10)
After-tax profits are accordingly given by
ΠFA = (ΠA +ΠB)− VA − VB,
= (1− t)[F (KA, S) + F (KB, S)− S]−RK −H (G) . (11)
where t = KA
K
tA+
KB
K
tB is the average eﬀective tax rate on the part of the MNE. Note
that the transfer price set by the multinational has no bearing on the definition of
the tax base for use in either country. Hence, in order to maximize after tax profits,
the MNE will wish to set G equal to its ’true’ value of one half. Accordingly, in this
model transfer pricing is not present under Formula Apportionment.
To find the MNE’s choice of capital stocks and quantity of the public input
we derive the first order conditions for maximization of after-tax profits. In the
following we focus on the case of initially identical rates of tax.18 The conditions
are:
∂ΠFA
∂Ki
= (1− t)F i1 − [F (KA, S) + F (KB, S)− S]
Kj
K2
(ti − tj)−R = 0, (12)
∂ΠFA
∂S
= FA2 + F
B
2 − 1 = 0 (13)
The first order conditions in (12) for the choice of capital stocks are more complicated
than under SA (compare with (4)), as they contain an extra term. A rise in, say,
18Again, as in the SA case, there is a two-stage framework in the background. The decisions taken
at the second stage are presented here, while the decisions taken at the first stage are presented in
subsection 4.1.
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KA, directly increases the (after-tax) marginal product of capital as well as the total
user cost of capital. In addition, it induces a change in the average tax rate which
will tend to fall, if tA < tB, raising the after-tax marginal contribution of capital to
profits. This eﬀect is captured by the second term on the right hand side of (12).
The first order condition for S, on the contrary, is particularly simple here — the
sum of marginal productivities has to equal unity. No extra term reflecting costs
and benefits of transfer pricing (viz. (5)) appears.19
Totally diﬀerentiating the first order conditions we derive formulas for how cap-
ital stocks and public input choice are aﬀected by tax changes (a fortiori assuming
identical taxes at the outset),
∂Ki
∂ti
=
F1F22F11 + (F22F11 − F 212)(2F − S)/K
2(1− t)F11(F22F11 − F 212)
∂Ki
∂tj
=
F1F22F11 − (F22F11 − F 212)(2F − S)/K
2(1− t)F11(F22F11 − F 212)
(14)
∂S
∂ti
=
F1F12
2(1− t)(F22F11 − F 212)
>From (14) we can conclude that
0 >
∂KA
∂tA
=
∂KB
∂tB
<
∂KA
∂tB
=
∂KB
∂tA
,
∂S
∂ti
< 0, i = A,B. (15)
The inequalities in (15) relate that under SA, the eﬀect of a tax increase on the
MNE’s capital stock in the same country is negative. Diﬀerent from under SA, the
sign of the cross-eﬀect on capital employed in the other country is now ambiguous
(cf. (6)). This is seen from (14) by examining the numerator of ∂Ki/∂tj. It can
then be seen that the numerator may become negative if its second term dominates
the first. This will happen if the renumeration of suppressed production factors of
the MNE in the two countries (relative to the stock of capital), (2F − S)/K − F1,
is large, and if F12 as an indicator of how cooperative capital and public inputs are,
is small.
19Note that with equal taxes the values entering the first order conditions for the MNE are the
same irrespectively of whether it operates under a SA or a FA regime. However, as we shall see,
the comparative statics results, and hence the externalities, are markedly diﬀerent in the two cases.
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The intuition for the ambiguity as to the cross-eﬀect on capital is as follows: On
one hand, the increase in the tax in country j raises the average eﬀective tax rate,
t. As overall capital now is more heavily taxed, its after-tax marginal productivity
falls, and this leads to a reduction in overall capital in both countries. On the
other hand, since the tax in country i is now smaller than that in country j, the
average eﬀective tax can be lowered through a relative increase in the capital stock
in country i, relative to that of country j. If the second eﬀect dominates the first, the
cross-eﬀect on capital in country i of the tax increase in country j will be positive,
and vice versa.
In the Cobb-Douglas example from section 3, ∂Ki/∂tj can be found to be pro-
portional to the expression [2γ − α(1 − α)], which clearly has an ambiguous sign.
Again, however, if the share of rents, γ, is large, a positive cross-eﬀect on capital is
guaranteed.
>From (5) and (14) we deduce that the eﬀect of a tax increase in any country
on the use of the public input is the same under FA and SA, and that the eﬀect of a
coordinated tax increase on the stock of capital in either country (or, alternatively,
the eﬀect of a tax increase in one of the two countries on total capital employed by
the MNE) likewise is the same under the two international tax regimes. Given our
symmetry assumptions, this is what we should expect.
4.1 Tax spillovers under FA
In a similar fashion as in the previous section we may now examine the eﬀect on tax
revenue in country A from a tax increase in country B. In particular, the eﬀect on
tax revenue in A from a marginal change in tB is,
∂VA
∂tB
= [F (KA, S) + F (KB, S)− S] tA
Ã
KB
∂KA
∂tB
−KA ∂KB∂tB
K2
!
+tAF1
KA
K
∂K
∂tB
. (16)
>From (16), it follows directly that;
Proposition 2 The eﬀect of an increase in tB on tax revenue in country A is
ambiguous.
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Qualitatively, the result is the same as under SA. The reason for the ambiguity,
however, diﬀers. Formula (16) contains two eﬀects. The first is the direct fiscal
externality on A’s tax base from a change in tB. This eﬀect is positive. The reason
is that under FA - in contrast to the case of SA - the MNE cannot use the transfer
price as a profit shifting device (see (11)). Instead, an increase in tB will induce a re-
location of capital to the country with the lower tax rate (i.e., country A). However,
the tax increase also makes it less attractive to invest in capital in general. Hence,
the global capital stock falls and thus also the tax base in country A. Depending on
which of the two eﬀects dominates, the cross-eﬀect on tax revenue may be positive
or negative.We can therefore conclude that, contrary to what many analysts seem
to believe, corporate taxation under FA will impose externalities on other countries
in a situation with multinational enterprises using common public inputs, but the
externalities may on net be either negative or positive.
4.1.1 The Cobb-Douglas example
Using the same Cobb-Douglas function as before, the expression in (16) becomes
∂VA
∂tB
=
tF (1− β)
2(1− t)
(1− β)γ − α2(1− α)
α(1− α)γ
Again we note that the smaller is the renumeration to the hidden factor (γ), the more
flexible is capital employment. A very small γ produces a large negative revenue
externality. A positive externality is also possible, however; this requires a large
factor share of the suppressed factor as compared to the factor share of capital.
This situation is tantamount to a large pure profit or rent in production. A tax
increase in country B results in a higher share of the MNE’s taxable income being
assigned to country A via the relatively large decline in the capital stock of the
entity in B. This higher share implies a sharp increase in tax revenue, if there are
lots of profits from production. Finally, if the factor share of the public input is
small, then the revenue externality will be positive.
To conclude, then, our discussion so far has shown that tax rates may be set too
low or too high even when FA is employed. The crucial issues are now; which system,
SA or FA, entails the stronger externalities associated with corporate taxation, and
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will noncooperative taxes under FA be higher or lower than those under SA? These
issues are discussed in the next section.
5 Comparisons of SA and FA
We compare first the eﬀects of increases in tax rates (from the same level) on capital
stocks at home and abroad under SA and FA. It is easily seen from (6) and (14)
that:
∂Ki
∂ti
¯¯¯¯
FA
<
∂Ki
∂ti
¯¯¯¯
SA
<
∂Ki
∂tj
¯¯¯¯
SA
<
∂Ki
∂tj
¯¯¯¯
FA
(17)
Hence, FA implies a more drastic cut in the capital stock in the country under-
taking a tax increase than does SA. On the other hand, the cross-eﬀect on capital
in the other country is milder under FA (and may, in fact, be positive under cir-
cumstances noted above). As we have noticed already from formulas (6) and (14),
the eﬀect of a tax increase in either country on the use of the public input is the
same under SA and FA. We therefore turn to a comparison of the cross-eﬀects on
tax revenue.
>From (9) and (16), and using (6) and (14), we can derive
∂VA
∂tB
¯¯¯¯
FA
− ∂VA
∂tB
¯¯¯¯
SA
= t
"
F1
2 − ¡2F−S
K
¢2
2(1− t)F11 −
S
H 00
#
(18)
The diﬀerence between the cross-eﬀects on tax revenue under the two interna-
tional tax regimes is determined by, apart from the (common) tax rate, the two terms
in the parenthesis. The first term is positive, as both numerator20 and denominator
are negative, and represents the relative cost of distorting capital investment under
FA compared to SA in responce to a marginal change in the tax rate in one country.
This term is greater, the greater are pure profits associated with production by the
MNE. The second term is negative, and it is numerically smaller the more significant
are costs associated with exploiting transfer pricing.
20Remember that (2F − S)/K − F1 > 0 can be interpreted as the overall remuneration of
suppressed production factors of the MNE in the two countries (relative to the stock of capital).
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Denoting the sum of tax revenues in the two countries by V , that is, V = VA+VB,
it is easy to see that
∂V
∂ti
¯¯¯¯
SA
=
∂V
∂ti
¯¯¯¯
FA
(19)
In other words, starting from the same uniform level of taxation, an increase in
the tax of either country will yield the same eﬀect on total tax revenue in the two
countries under SA and FA. So only the division of revenue changes diﬀers between
the two regimes. From this we conclude that
∂VA
∂tB
¯¯¯¯
FA
− ∂VA
∂tB
¯¯¯¯
SA
< 0 if and only if
∂VA
∂tA
¯¯¯¯
FA
− ∂VA
∂tA
¯¯¯¯
SA
> 0
(again, for the same levels of taxes under the two regimes). Thus, we have that:
Proposition 3 At a given and uniform level of taxation in the two countries, the
cross-eﬀect (own-eﬀect) on tax revenue from a unilateral tax increase will be smaller
(larger) under Formula Apportionment than under Separate Accounting, if and only
if
F 21 −
¡
2F−S
K
¢2
2 (1− t)F11 <
S
H 00
(20)
In words, the requirement is that there are only moderate pure profits (a low
relative remuneration of any hidden third factor of production), and that there are
only insignificant costs associated with exploiting transfer pricing. It is intuitive
that small transfer pricing costs lead to relatively low eﬀects on own tax revenue
under separate accounting, because here a tax increase implies a relatively drastic
cut in the tax base. Small pure profits also imply that the decrease in the share
assigned to the country raising its tax under FA will be only modest.
It follows from (20) that if the two tax principles were put on an equal footing,
in the sense that the problem of transfer pricing also vanished under SA (i.e., H 00
approaches infinity), a tax increase by country B will increase tax revenue in country
A by more under FA than SA. Put diﬀerently, in the absence of transfer pricing, a
unilateral tax increase creates a larger positive externality under FA than SA.21
21A similar point is also made by Keen (1999).
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To make this point clearer, equation (20) can be rewritten for the case of the
Cobb-Douglas example of the previous sections as follows:
∂VA
∂tB
¯¯¯¯
FA
− ∂VA
∂tB
¯¯¯¯
SA
= tF
·
(1 + α− β)γ
2(1− t)(1− α)α −
2β
H 00
¸
(21)
A very low H 00 definitely produces a greater revenue externality under SA, due to
a large loss of tax base via the MNE’s transfer pricing. Conversely, a very high H 00
eliminates transfer pricing as a threat and ensures that the larger revenue externality
occurs under FA instead. Equation (21) also shows when FA leads to the lowest
revenue externality. This occurs when γ is very low (i.e., a virtual absence of rents
and thus also movements of rents in response to tax changes). Finally, we may
recapitulate that if the public input disappears, there no longer is any revenue
externality under SA, whereas there still is a positive externality under FA.
Starting from zero taxes both countries enjoy positive increments in tax revenue
from marginally raising their tax rates. In order to maximize tax revenue they move
up the tax rate, until the marginal increase in revenue from doing so becomes equal
to zero. If at the rate of tax, where tax revenue is maximized under SA, it holds true
that the own eﬀect on revenue of a tax increase is smaller under SA than under FA,
then we can conclude that the non-cooperative level of taxation under SA will be
less than the non-cooperative level of taxation under FA. We state this observation
as
Proposition 4 The non-cooperative level of taxation under FA will exceed that un-
der SA, if and only if (20) holds.
To reiterate, this happens if it is not very costly for the MNE to engage in
transfer pricing (so that the threat of transfer pricing is a major consideration for
tax authorities under SA), and if the pure profits resulting from production are
modest.
Can anything be said about which international tax regime is preferable, and
when? To answer this question it is not suﬃcient to simply ascertain which of SA
and FA leads to the higher level of tax in the non-cooperative equilibrium. Instead
we need to know which of the two regimes leads to the higher tax revenue in the two
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countries (tax revenue maximization being the objective). In our simple symmetric
set up, tax revenue as a function of the common tax level is bound to be a well-
behaved concave function. On the basis of the level of tax under SA and FA, and
the relative size of cross-eﬀects on revenue, we can reveal some instances, in which
the SA scheme will dominate the FA scheme (or vice versa). Close inspection of (8),
(16), and (18) enables the following proposition:
Proposition 5 Starting from a non-cooperative tax equilibrium under Separate Ac-
counting, suﬃcient conditions for a move to Formula Apportionment to lower tax
revenue in both countries are either"
F1
2 − ¡2F−S
K
¢2
2(1− t)F11 <
S
H 00
≤ F1
2F 212
2(1− t)F11(F22F11 − F 212)
#
or the same set of inequalities with the inequality signs reversed.
Proof. Using formulas (8), (16), and (18) we see that the two sets of inequalities
in the Proposition are the conditions for
∂VA
∂tB
¯¯¯¯
FA
<
∂VA
∂tB
¯¯¯¯
SA
≤ 0
respectively
∂VA
∂tB
¯¯¯¯
FA
>
∂VA
∂tB
¯¯¯¯
SA
≥ 0
Given that all terms are valued in the non-cooperative tax equilibrium under SA we
deduce that these two sets of inequalities correspond to
t∗ ≤ tSA < tFA
respectively
t∗ ≥ tSA > tFA
where t∗ is the cooperative level of corporate income tax (common to either tax
regime), and tSA, tFA are the non-cooperative tax levels in the two tax regimes.
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Due to the concavity of the tax revenue function it is clear that in these two
circumstances a move from SA to FA must produce tax rates even further away
from the cooperative level and so reduce tax revenue in both countries.22
The suﬃcient conditions for revenue reduction in the Proposition imply interme-
diary values for the marginal cost of exploiting transfer pricing on the part of the
MNE. Furthermore, a combination of very moderate pure profits and very coopera-
tive production factors (capital and public inputs), or the opposite combination of
significant pure profits and very uncooperative factors of production is required. In
accordance with intuition, cases with rather low costs associated with transfer pric-
ing are not covered by the Proposition, since in these cases SA would be expected
to entail rather low non-cooperative levels of tax and significant revenue increases
upon introduction of FA.
We may one more time recall the Cobb-Douglas example from section 3. For
that example, the double inequality in Proposition 5 becomes equivalent to
4(1− t)α(1− α)β
(1 + α− β)γ > H
00 ≥ 4(1− t)(1− α)γ
α2
, (22)
(and the same set of inequalities with the inequality signs reversed). In words, a
combination of very low rents (γ) plus intermediate marginal transfer pricing costs
(H 00), or a combination of rather large profits and, again, intermediate costs of
transfer pricing, will guarantee that a switch from SA to FA will not be desirable.
Logically, there will also be other circumstances in which a switch from SA to
FA will be unwarranted. These circumstances have the non-cooperative taxes under
SA and FA on either side of the cooperative level, with the taxes under SA closer
(in terms of welfare deviations) to the optimal levels than the FA taxes.
22The reason for having two sets of inequalities in the proposition is that tax revenue spillovers
can be either negative or positive. In the first case, negative revenue externalities, ∂VA∂tB
¯¯¯
FA
<
∂VA
∂tB
¯¯¯
SA
≤ 0, imply that the cooperative solution lies below the non-cooperative one, t∗ ≤ tSA <
tFA. In the latter case, positive revenue externalities entail that the cooperative solution exceeds
the non-cooperative one, t∗ ≥ tSA > tFA.
22
6 Welfare maximization as the objective
We now assume that the authorities of the two countries in the model aim at max-
imizing welfare in lieu of solely maximizing tax revenue. As this section shows,
provided that MNE’s are owned in a balanced fashion between the two countries,
we are able to derive results that are completely equivalent to the ones in the pre-
vious sections.
The country A-based MNE is now assumed to be owned in proportions a : (1−a)
in the two countries, that is, the fraction a of the shares in the MNE is possessed
by individuals living in country A. The welfare — or social surplus — measure is the
sum of tax revenue, weighted by a (fixed) marginal cost of public funds (MCPF),
denoted by ρ, and the part of MNE net profits accruing to domestic residents. We
shall assume that ρ takes on the same value in both countries. Since the price of the
MNE’s output is simply constant, there is no need to incorporate consumers surplus
in the social surplus measure.
6.1 Separate Accounting
Consider separate accounting first. After-tax profits of the MNE under SA are
ΠSA = (1− tA)[FA + (G− 1)S] + (1− tB)[FB −GS]−RK −H(G).
Here FA is short for F (KA, S), and similarly for FB. Tax revenue in country A is
VA = tA[F
A + (G− 1)S],
and social surplus amounts to
WA = ρVA + aΠ
SA.
First order conditions on the part of the MNE are unchanged. We are especially
interested in the cross-eﬀect on welfare, i.e. the eﬀect of a tax increase in country
B on social surplus in country A. Making use of the envelope theorem, we get
∂WA
∂tB
= ρtA
·
FA1
∂KA
∂tB
+ S
∂G
∂tB
¸
− a[FB −GS] (23)
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In (23), an increase in tB has two opposite eﬀects on the tax revenue in country A.
The capital stock in A is reduced, and that takes the tax base and tax revenue in
the same direction. On the other hand, the transfer price G is raised, increasing
tax revenue. The tax base of country A may therefore go up or down depending
on the relative magnitudes of these two eﬀects. In addition, the tax increase lowers
after-tax profits on the part of the MNE, and to the extent the company is owned
by country A’s residents, this reduces social surplus. The latter third eﬀect is new
compared to the preceding analysis, and in isolation it decreases the chance of a
positive spillover on the relevant objective function in country A.
6.2 Formula Apportionment
Under FA, MNE after-tax profits read
ΠFA = (1− t)[FA + FB − S]−RK −H(G),
with the average tax rate t defined as in section 4 above. Tax revenue in country A
amounts to
VA = tA
KA
K
[FA + FB − S],
while social surplus a fortiori is measured as
WA = ρVA + aΠ
FA.
Again, first order conditions on the part of the MNE are unchanged. Making
heavy use of the envelope theorem we obtain
∂WA
∂tB
= ρtA
"
(FA + FB − S)KB
∂KA
∂tB
+KA
∂KB
∂tB
K2
+ F1
KA
K
∂K
∂tB
#
−a(FA + FB − S) ∂t
∂tB
. (24)
As explained previously, the cross-eﬀect on tax revenue under FA is of ambiguous
sign, as it consists of a positive and a negative eﬀect. In addition, the tax in country
B increases the MNE’s eﬀective average tax and thereby lowers after-tax profit
income received by shareholders in country A.
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6.3 Comparison of SA and FA
In what follows we assume that the two tax rates tA and tB are identical at the
outset. As tax policy in the two countries now has multiple aims, viz. obtaining
tax revenue and securing MNE profits for domestic citizens, the two countries will
not choose the same tax rate, unless they balance these two aims in the same way.
For this to occur the MNE under consideration must be symmetrically owned in the
two countries, that is, a must be equal to one half.23
The assumption of a = 1/2 and identical tax rates at the outset simplifies the
two expressions for social surplus changes above and renders a comparison between
the two particularly simple. In fact, we easily establish
∂WA
∂tB
¯¯¯¯
SA
>
∂WA
∂tB
¯¯¯¯
FA
iﬀ
∂VA
∂tB
¯¯¯¯
SA
>
∂VA
∂tB
¯¯¯¯
FA
(25)
Therefore, all our results in section 5 as to when the cross eﬀects (on revenue there,
on welfare here) under SA are higher than those under FA, etc., go through here
with no modifications. It is also easily seen that as an alternative to the A-MNE
being symmetrically owned in the two countries, a situation in which an A-MNE
is owned at home in country A to the extent a, and a similar B-MNE is owned in
its home country (B) likewise to the degree a, would also produce the equivalence
just mentioned. Full symmetry and balanced ownership in one form or the other
is accordingly required for the results as to the relative size of tax spillovers to be
equivalent under revenue maximization and under maximization of welfare.
7 Discussion
With the spreading and increasing economic importance of multinational enterprises
(MNEs), and the well documented use of transfer pricing, the viability of today’s
corporate income tax system as relying on Separate Accounting (SA) has come under
23If, say, the MNE was primarily owned in country A, and there were no other MNEs to take
into account, this asymmetry would be reflected in country B choosing a greater optimal rate of
tax than country A, because it would attach a smaller weight to profit flows and a higher relative
weight to tax revenues.
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pressure. Analysts are looking for an alternative system of taxation which will limit
the vulnerability of the corporate tax system to MNEs’ movement of surpluses from
high tax to low tax countries without introducing other serious problems.
One such candidate is the Formula Apportionment system as currently practiced
in, e.g., Canada and the US. The central idea of the FA is to assign, using a formula,
a share of a MNE’s overall surplus to each single jurisdiction, after which that
jurisdiction can apply its own rate of tax to that income share.
In this paper we have given certain aspects of SA and FA a closer look. Specifi-
cally, we have studied the fiscal externalities operating under these tax systems. We
employed a symmetric model of two countries and MNEs which operated entities
in either country. Having characterized how the MNE’s capital stock and use of a
public input depended on corporate tax rates in the two countries, we looked at the
cross-eﬀects of a tax hike in one country on tax revenue (or welfare) in the other.
Comparing these under SA and FA we were finally able to conclude as follows: If
the pure profits harvested by the MNE are either very low or very high, and at the
same time the costs on the part of the MNE of engaging in transfer pricing are of
intermediate size, then a switch from SA to FA will for sure lower tax revenue (wel-
fare) in the two countries. There are additional circumstances in which the switch
will likewise be undesirable, but these are harder to identify, since non-cooperative
taxes will be too low under one regime and too high under the other. Finally, of
course, there are also conditions, under which FA will be preferable to SA.
The upshot, hence, is that the choice between SA and FA is not a clear-cut one,
so that it is doubtful whether Formula Apportionment is the answer to the problems
encountered by today’s Separate Accounting system. Add to this that we have in our
analysis presumed a high degree of coordination between countries in arranging FA;
in particular, a common definition of the overall surplus on the part of MNEs was
used, and the same apportionment formula was applied in each country to delimit
its taxable income share. Such degree of coordination between sovereign countries
is questionable, at best.
Our analysis has in a sense focused on ’average’ or ’typical’ tax spillovers between
countries applying either SA or FA in the corporate tax system, making heavy use of
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symmetry assumptions. Some of the gravest problems associated with SA, however,
surely pertain to asymmetry, i.e. situations in which some countries would prefer to
be able to set rather high corporate taxes compared to other countries and therefore
find themselves especially vulnerable to MNE transfer pricing. It will certainly be
interesting (but also very complicated, according to our preliminary attempts) to
examine the relative working of SA and FA in such asymmetric set ups. For now,
we shall have to leave this for future research.
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